Turkey’s 2024 Elections: A Struggle for Democracy Amid Authoritarian Backlash

They called 2024 the “year of elections,” with billions of people voting across the globe in over 100 countries. For many, it was a test for democracy, a kind of “make it or break it” moment. However, it is clearly way more complicated than that, and the question arises, what happens to democracy in an authoritarian state? Turkey has been described as a regime by many analysts. Elections are still taking place, but with a caveat: the ruling party does not accept the results and often overthrows elected opposition officials, assigning their own people in their place. Opposition leaders are imprisoned with banal excuses. It happened in 2016, and it happened this year as well.

On March 31, 2024, the municipal elections marked a historic turning point. For the first time since its establishment in 2002, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which had won every election it participated in, fell behind the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The CHP secured 37.1% of the vote in the mayoral races nationwide, becoming the party with the highest vote share after 47 years. The AKP, on the other hand, garnered only 35.9%. Notably, traditional AKP strongholds, such as Adıyaman, transitioned to CHP leadership. In Bursa, the CHP regained control of the municipality for the first time since 2004. Similarly, in Balıkesir and Kırıkkale, the CHP won local elections for the first time, while Kilis returned to CHP leadership for the first time since 1995.

The AKP’s decline was particularly significant in Kurdish-majority regions, where it suffered its lowest vote share in two decades across five local election cycles. This shift highlights a notable change in Kurdish voter preferences and the increasing influence of opposition parties in the region.

Already in 2019, the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) had secured a landslide victory in municipal elections and a historic milestone for Kurdish representation in Turkey’s politics. The pro-Kurdish party won 75 mayoral positions, including three metropolitan municipalities and seven provinces despite a decade of intense political repression and allegations of election tampering by the AKP. Subsequently, the AKP government started to remove and imprison elected officials and rule the provinces with government-appointed trustees, culminating in the process of outlawing HDP in 2021. Merging together with the Left and Green Party (YSP) under the umbrella of People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) in 2023, the HDP-led opposition was able to reclaim government-approriated municipalities in the 2024 elections, solidifying the 2019 gains.

A significant factor in 2024 was the opposition’s new strategic coalition. The CHP, the DEM Party, and the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TİP) forged an alliance in key cities. This approach sought to counter the authoritarian, monopolistic, and exploitative practices of the ruling bloc; prioritizing the shared interests of diverse social groups and advocating for inclusive urban governance. However, the ruling coalition—the AKP and its small partner, the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)—soon retaliated, targeting this opposition coalition by appointing a government trustee to the Esenyurt Municipality, one of Turkey’s largest districts. The elected mayor, Ahmet Özer, was arrested as part of an investigation launched on charges of “being a member of the PKK/KCK armed terrorist organization,” using as an excuse some phone conversations he had during the previous peace process.

The AKP has generally intensified its campaign against the municipalities it lost to opposition parties—beyond the appointment of trustees, the ruling party has gone on to employ more contentious tactics. For instance, under the new so-called Animal Protection Law, which did not gain traction during the AKP-controlled municipal periods—despite years of their neglect of sterilization and vaccination programs—stray dogs can now be legally euthanized, killed by electrocution, or even shot in certain cases. This move is widely seen as an attempt by the AKP to create friction between opposition-led municipalities and the public which is fiercefully against it.

Additionally, following President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s recent call to “shake down CHP municipalities,” enforcement actions have been taken against municipalities that transitioned from the AKP to opposition control. Long-standing Social Security Institution (SGK) debts have been cited as the basis for freezing the bank accounts of major metropolitan municipalities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Mersin, and Adana. While some municipalities claim they have no outstanding debts, others point out that they originated during AKP administrations.

These measures have drawn criticism as politically motivated efforts to undermine opposition municipalities, especially in the wake of Erdoğan’s electoral loss and his government’s diminishing public support.

The election results underscore the growing cracks in the AKP’s dominance and the potential for renewed political movements in Turkey. Notably, the current situation points to a critical juncture for addressing the Kurdish question, which remains central to the broader struggle for democracy and pluralism in the country. Without solving the Kurdish question, the rights and freedoms issues in Turkey, will remain unresolved.

The lead-up to Turkey’s local elections was marked by allegations of voter manipulation, particularly targeting the DEM Party. Accusations by opposition parties and journalists following the elections on the ground surfaced, claiming that over 55,000 individuals were strategically relocated to critical provinces and districts to influence the vote. On election day, images of military and police personnel labeled as “transported voters” in Kurdish-majority areas ignited heated debates. The DEM Party publicly disclosed that it had identified 46,901 such fraudulent voters.

These irregularities were also highlighted in the Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities’ report on Turkey’s local elections, signaling international attention to systemic issues undermining electoral integrity.

Despite the irregularities, the DEM Party reclaimed municipalities in Kurdish-majority regions previously governed by state-appointed trustees after the closure case opened against the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) first in 2019 and then again in 2021.  The party’s resounding victories sparked debates in Ankara about whether the government would reinstate trustees in municipalities, which were won by the DEM Party.

The DEM Party emerged as the dominant force in nearly all Kurdish-majority provinces, significantly widening the margin over the AKP compared to the 2019 HDP victory. In a powerful comeback, the pro-Kurdish party regained control of Ağrı and Dersim (Tunceli), cities HDP had lost in the previous election cycle.

Election data, including voter turnout, party vote shares, and total votes cast, reveal that these results reflect more than political success. They represent a broader societal shift and a demand for change, especially in Kurdish regions.

Celebrating the party’s triumphs, DEM Party co-Chair Tülay Hatimoğulları declared in a victory speech: “The war alliance has been defeated,” referring to the ruling AKP-led bloc.

Meanwhile, President Erdoğan acknowledged his party’s setbacks, admitting that the desired outcomes were not achieved. However, his rhetoric quickly turned to external threats, with renewed pledges for military incursions into Iraq and Syria.

The AKP’s response to its loss was swift and aggressive. Just two days after the elections, the government annulled Abdullah Zeydan’s mayoral victory with the DEM Party as co-mayor-elect of the city of Van. He won with 55.48% of the vote. Instead, the office was handed to the AKP’s candidate who had secured only 27% of the vote.

The removal of Zeydan sparked massive protests in Van, with tens of thousands taking to the streets. Turkish police violently dispersed demonstrators, arresting 260 people. Under pressure, the government eventually reinstated Zeydan—a rare instance of reversal. In a symbolic act of defiance and resilience, Kurdish youth organized cleanup efforts to clear the city of debris left from the protests.

Amid the political turmoil, the government launched coordinated operations targeting Kurdish media outlets, further intensifying this climate of repression. On the morning of April 23, simultaneous raids in Turkey and in Belgium targeted Kurdish newsrooms. In Turkey, police stormed the homes of journalists in Istanbul, Ankara, and Urfa, detaining nine individuals. Meanwhile, in Belgium, police raided the studios of Stêrk TV and Medya Haber TV, both prominent Kurdish broadcasters.  

Another significant incursion, following AKA losses, was the so-called Kobani Trial against Kurdish politicians, which culminated in verdicts just 45 days later, on May 16, 2024. The trial, rooted in protests that erupted across Kurdish-majority cities on October 6–8, 2014, in response to ISIS attacks on Kobani, implicated 108 politicians, including the former co-chairs of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), Figen Yüksekdağ and Selahattin Demirtaş. The trial spanned three years, raising widespread concerns about political motives.  

On June 6, 2023, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in favor of Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ, finding Turkey violating the European Convention on Human Rights. Despite this, on May 16, 2024, the court swiftly announced heavy sentences against Kurdish politicians.  

In a statement after the verdict, the former HDP Party leader Selahattin Demirtaş, who has been imprisoned since 2016, described the ruling as an act of vengeance against advocates of peaceful politics: “We have always defended democratic politics and will continue to do so. However, the Turkish state views the strengthening of Kurds through democratic means as more dangerous than taking up arms. The state has consistently prioritized war and violence over political solutions, and that mindset has not changed today,” he stated.  

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed satisfaction with the Kobani Trial’s verdicts, reinforcing his administration’s hardline stance on Kurdish political movements. The case has deepened concerns about the suppression of opposition voices in Turkey, as the struggle between authoritarian governance and democratic aspirations continues to play out on a national and international stage.

Following Turkey’s local elections, the government’s first trustee appointment came with the removal of Hakkâri Municipality co-Mayor Mehmet Sıddık Akış. The Ministry of Interior replaced Akış with the provincial governor, citing “temporary measures” despite the absence of a concrete judicial ruling.  

Shortly thereafter, a local court in Hakkâri sentenced Akış to 20 years in prison for membership in the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Akış, who was removed from office on June 1, was arrested the same day. The decision was based on a case dating back to 2009. The DEM Party condemned the court ruling and trustee appointment as a “coup against the people’s will.” MPs from the DEM Party protested the move in the Turkish Parliament.  

In a statement, the DEM Party alleged that the government deliberately refrained from taking any legal action against Akış before the elections but expedited the case immediately afterward to justify his removal. Concerns grew over the possibility of further trustee appointments in other Kurdish municipalities and protests erupted across Kurdish-majority cities in response.  

The leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), also criticized the removal of Akış, calling it an affront to democracy. The practice of reviving years-old judicial cases to remove elected mayors fueled accusations of a “judicial trap” orchestrated by the Turkish government. Critics, including bar association presidents, highlighted significant violations of the rule of law.  

“Judicial authorities must act in accordance with the law. Practices that violate the presumption of innocence should cease immediately. We oppose the instrumentalization of the judiciary, as such actions severely undermine trust in justice,” said a joint statement from legal professionals.  

The crackdown wave even extended to cultural expressions. Kurdish individuals were arrested and detained for dancing to Kurdish songs. In Mersin, young people celebrating with Kurdish music were detained after their video was targeted by nationalist social media accounts. Lawyers revealed that detainees were forced to listen to the ultra-nationalist song *“Ölürüm Türkiyem”* (“I Die for You, Turkey”) while under police custody.  

In Istanbul, Ağrı, and Siirt, a total of 12 individuals were arrested for dancing to Kurdish songs at weddings. Authorities in Siirt claimed the celebrations constituted “terrorist propaganda.”  

In municipalities where the DEM regained control, initiatives to restore erased Kurdish signage and bilingual practices began. Road signs featured phrases such as “Pêşî Peya/Önce Yaya” (“Pedestrians First”) and “Hêdî/Yavaş” (“Slow Down”). However, state interventions soon reversed these efforts. In Van, police accompanied the removal of Kurdish signs, replacing them with nationalist slogans like “Turkey is Turkish and will remain Turkish.”

 In Diyarbakır, Mardin, and Batman, bilingual signage was also removed following a directive from the Ministry of Interior on July 26. DEM municipalities criticized these actions, stating they ignored public demands and reaffirmed their commitment to bilingual practices despite state interference.  

The suppression of Kurdish cultural and linguistic expression reflects Turkey’s historical policies aimed at erasing Kurdish and other minority identities. Documents such as the 1925 Eastern Reform Plan (Şark Islahat Planı) and the 1930 “Turkification Circular” codified efforts to assimilate Kurds and consolidate central authority in the country’s eastern and southeastern regions.  

The Eastern Reform Plan sought to dismantle Kurdish culture through demographic engineering, banning Kurdish language and attire, and promoting Turkish. The Turkification Circular emphasized replacing Kurdish village names with Turkish ones, forbidding Kurdish dress, and enforcing education in Turkish.  

These policies laid the groundwork for the cultural and linguistic suppression that continues today. As the Kurdish question remains central to Turkey’s democratic challenges, these historical frameworks underscore the enduring struggle for Kurdish identity and rights.

In the past month, significant developments have taken place in Turkey’s immediate vicinity, and this process has brought the need for “maintaining domestic peace and stability” to the forefront of political discussions.

Israel’s attacks on Gaza have expanded the area of conflict to Lebanon, and figures such as Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah have been targeted. Although Iran announced that it had launched a comprehensive military operation in response to these attacks by Israel, its effective operations remain lackluster. These developments show that Israel-Iran tensions pose a risk of escalation and increase the potential for wider regional conflict. The US President Joe Biden’s statement that he would not support an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities reveals how sensitive the strategic balances are in the region.

In this complex geopolitical environment, Turkey has been at the center of discussions about “strengthening the domestic front.”. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has emphasized the need for a new constitution while clarifying the government’s position against opposition rumors of early elections. In addition, his statements inviting the opposition to compromise have opened the door to a policy of “normalization.”

During the parliamentary session on October 1, notable gestures hinted at shifting political dynamics. The most surprising move came from Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli, who extended an olive branch to DEM Party, shook hands with the MPs, and directed a striking appeal to Abdullah Öcalan.  

Bahçeli’s approach towards the DEM Party was an important turning point. Bahçeli, who had previously advocated the closure of the DEM Party, gave the party a message of conciliation.

Bahçeli’s handshake with DEM MPs was followed by his October 22 proposal urging Öcalan to disband the PKK and address parliament via the DEM Party’s platform. Linking this proposal to an extension of Erdoğan’s presidency, Bahçeli suggested Öcalan could benefit from legal adjustments under the “right to hope” framework.  

DEM responded, stating: “open the doors of İmralı; we’re as curious as you are about what Öcalan has to say.” This prompted renewed speculation about potential talks with Öcalan. On October 23, Ömer Öcalan confirmed his visit to İmralı, sharing his uncle’s message: “Isolation continues. If conditions are met, I have the theoretical and practical capacity to shift this process from conflict and violence to a legal and political platform.”

Bahçeli’s call for Öcalan to renounce the PKK and enter political dialogue has sparked widespread debate. DEM’s reaction, coupled with Öcalan’s message, has intensified discussions on whether Turkey is on the brink of a new peace process or merely engaging in political theater.   

The prospect of a renewed peace process remains uncertain. While rising tensions in the Israel-Iran-Lebanon-Syria axis present risks, they also offer opportunities for Turkey to seek international and domestic support for resolving its Kurdish issue. However, the regime’s appointment of trustees to Kurdish municipalities undermines confidence in any rapid path of normalization.  

Turkey now stands at a crossroads. The decisions made in the coming months will determine whether the country moves toward reconciliation or deeper conflict. This process will not only be shaped by internal political dynamics but also by the broader regional context. The fall of Bashar Al-Assad has absorbed Erdogan’s focus. Turkey has been supporting jihadist factions as to oppose the self-governing territories of Syrian Kurds. He uses them as pawns to attack Kurdish areas and prevent any meaningful development in the area.

Nonetheless, the Kurdish question remains one of Turkey’s most critical challenges. Regional developments and shifting domestic political landscapes present new opportunities and heightened risks for addressing this issue. For lasting peace and stability, the Turkish state must engage in sincere dialogue and negotiation processes. The international community also has a constructive role in supporting these efforts.  

Ultimately, Turkey’s future hinges on how it resolves the Kurdish question. Whether the state seizes the opportunity to pursue peace or allows the problem to fester will shape not only its domestic stability but also its role in an increasingly volatile region.