The Revolution that Never Came: The April 25 Insurrection in Italy

Revolutions are processes in evolution with thousands of events, ideas, actions, and hopes intersecting and forming complex webs that can take different shapes at different times. All liberation processes thrive on the internal complexity of their proponents and the contradictions that develop in the action against the reality imposed by the current system. The unfolding future is like a ship at the mercy of the waves of insurrections, revolts, and reactions, which can, depending on the currents, take it to one shore or another, sometimes bringing it back to where it departed.

The Italian insurrection of April 25, 1945, marked the highest point of the partisan war against Nazism and fascism, the peak of a revolution that was possible at that historical moment. However, 80 years later, it remains in collective memory as a mythologized, reductionist, and institutionalized version, stripped of all its most radical and subversive elements. April 25 has become a commemoration, a celebration of the liberal state which born out of the defeat of the popular insurrection. In a historical moment like ours, when authoritarianism—which never completely vanished—reshapes itself into more reactionary positions with the powerful resurgence of nationalism, revisiting and analyzing the events of the partisan war are crucial for avoiding superficial praises and falling into the same traps.

The following essay aims to provide a historical account of the events and the political lines that developed and confronted each other in the course of the Italian partisan war. Focusing on the communist movement at the expense of other currents, such as the anarchist one, is not intended to diminish those experiences, nor to say they were less important, but stems from the fact that communism and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) had hegemony over the popular and working masses during those years. The anarchist movement had suffered the harshest repression in fascist Italy, and

many Italian anarchists had given their lives fighting for the Spanish Revolution of 1936. The vast majority of the partisans espoused communist and socialist ideals. The red flag and red star were the symbols of that war, and, on concrete and ideological levels, the Soviet Union and Stalin largely dictated the lines of the partisan war—often with disappointing consequences for those who took part in it.

Why was the Italian Liberation War—the largest armed popular uprising in the industrialized Western Europe—unable to go beyond a democratic-bourgeois republic that was established in 1945 in continuity between the fascist and liberal administrations? Why, despite the mass revolutionary impulse driven by great aspirations for social emancipation, did the armed people fail to complete their revolution? To fully understand the reasons, we must start from a decade prior to the insurrection, namely from the VII Congress of the Communist International in 1935 which marked the beginning of a new political phase with significant consequences for the Italian war of liberation.

1935-1941: Before the Partisan War: The PCI between the VII Congress and The Spanish Civil War

After the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the the Bolshevik Party’s coup d’état to establish its dictatorship, and after the betrayal by the
social democratic Second International in support of imperialist wars, various communist parties emerged in Western Europe in the wake of the World War I, subjected to the newborn, Moscow-led Communist International. Also in Italy, the PCI formed in 1921 and aligned itself with the Soviet Union.

The capitalist crisis of 1929, instead of leading to the opening of a new revolutionary phase, strengthened the reactionary forces of fascism and Nazism. The official stance of communist parties was to place democracy, social democracy, and fascism on the same level and fight against all of them, focusing especially on the social democrats whom they labeled as “social fascists.” This resulted in catastrophic outcomes of which the limited effectiveness of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) in countering the rise of Nazism is emblematic.

However, with its VII Congress in 1935, the International made a u-turn in its approach to fascism: the new strategy was to create a united front of the working class, reaching out to social democratic parties, and to form popular fronts on the parliamentary level, opening up even for anti-fascist bourgeois parties. They proposed an alliance with the bourgeoisie with the confidence that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would eventually become the dominant force within these coalitions and establish socialism through them. From this new “popular front” line, minimalist demands emerged, marking a shift from revolutionary sectarianism to integralist positions as the communists tried to rally diverse anti-fascist elements under lowest common denominators. The issue of war, which was starting to be felt around Europe, was reduced to the defensive role of the USSR led by Stalin.

In Italy, the PCI—a clandestine party at the time—interpreted the new indications of the International by developing a political line of democratizing fascism, re-proposing the “revolutionary fascism” of 1919, and seeking the support of the fascists disillusioned by the regime. This line was expounded in the Lo Stato Operaio (PCI’s monthly magazine printed in exile in Paris) editorial “The Reconciliation of the Italian People,” published on June 6, 1936.

However, the war in Spain that broke out in July 1936 marked a new turning point in international politics, also for the communists. Initially, the PCI did not intervene in the conflict, being too focused on its policy of reconciliation with fascism. This stance was criticized by Moscow which imposed a strategic change once again. The policy of reconciliation was abandoned, a new line of fighting fascism was established, and the Italian party was criticized for not having grasped the significance of the Spanish Civil War. Among those who now departed to Spain were Palmiro Togliatti, the exiled leader of the PCI, a prominent member of the International, and a staunch loyalist of Stalin.

Volunteering in Spain brought a new cadre of Italian militants to the communist ranks, at the same time increasing the willingness to combat fascism militarily. Inspired by Republican Spain, the PCI and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) signed the first pact of action in 1937 to establish a democratic republic.

However, as the Spanish civil war was coming to an end, in August 1939, the communists were taken by yet another political earthquake: the Hitler-Stalin pact. The pact—also known as Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of non-aggression between Nazi Germany and Soviet Union—highlighted the contradictions of the VII Congress, bringing to light how the political line of the Communist International changed unpredictably according to the interests and necessities of the USSR.

These erratic years furthermore corresponded with the period of the “Great Purge” or “Great Terror” when Stalin annihilated the party opposition and various dissidents to secure his own survival. Thus, also in Italy, the communist dissidents were expelled and distanced from the PCI, further reducing the number of militants and making their clandestine work even more complex. At the same time, the “non-aggression pact” dragged the PCI, seen as an emissary of Stalin, into a phase of isolation from various other anti-fascist forces.

However, world politics once again stepped in when the Nazi aggression against the USSR in January 1941 led to another change of course, and a new unity among Italian anti-fascist political forces started to emerge.

1943: The End of the Fascist Regime, Badoglio Government, and the Foundation of CLN

In March 1943, the large industrial strikes brought the Italian working class back to the political scene. The strikes demonstrated great maturity, awareness, and organizational capacity after more than 20 years of immobility and repression under the fascist regime, and revealed a deep crisis within fascism, the spread of communist and socialist ideals in society, and the radicalization of a new phase of class conflict.

Three months later, in June 1943, the Committee of Oppositions was created, consisting of the PSI, the PCI, the maximalist socialists of the Proletarian Unity Movement (MUP), the republicans and socialist-liberals of the Action Party (Pd’A), the Italian Liberal Party(PLI), and the Christian Democracy(DC) representing the peasant masses. However, the proposed action front never materialized due to a lack of consensus on crucial strategic lines: on one hand, the idea of an armed insurrection was rejected by the DC and PLI, while on the other, the collaboration with the king and the army was rejected by the MUP and Pd’A.

The summer of 1943 also marked the end of the twenty-year fascist regime which fell on July 25 due to the internal pressures skillfully managed by the king. Having failed to create a common program, the anti-fascist parties found themselves cornered. In its search for unity, the PCI was not inclined to engage in direct confrontation and found itself unable to channel the spontaneous anti-fascist movement of the masses into a revolutionary uprising.

By prioritizing agreements at the top between the anti-fascist parties and the monarchy, the PCI did not comprehend the qualitative leap of the popular masses and the radicalization of the struggle based on class demands. The people increasingly saw in the end of fascism a possibility to sweep away the entire state apparatus and the bourgeoisie, especially the feudal landowners in the newly liberated South.

At the same time, the Badoglio government, appointed by the king, violently repressed the insurrectionary people and dissolved the Fascist Party while keeping individual fascists in their command positions: changing everything without changing anything. In order to maintain the political and legal continuity of the state, the Badoglio government suppressed all forms of popular dissent fueled by the economic crisis and war fatigue.

The communists and the anti-fascist left called for Badoglio’s resignation and the establishment of a national unity government. In Milan and Turin, where the connection between the communists and the labor movement was the strongest, grassroots pressure pushed the official anti-fascist movement towards strongly anti-government positions. Meanwhile, in Rome, the PCI, more distant from the actual movement, supported the Badoglio government in the name of unity at all costs.

However, there was also a faction within the PCI that accurately identified Badoglio and recognized his continuity with Mussolini and fascism. This minority faction advocated support for the revolting people who were fighting the new government in the South just as they fought against the fascist regime. They also reminded that Badoglio was “The man who savagely exterminated the Abyssinian people, who commanded the fascist bands in Spain and the occupation of Albania.”¹

On September 8, 1943, an armistice was declared between the Badoglio government and the Allies, outlining the period that marked the maximum disintegration of the Italian state and the total disbandment of the army, which enabled the Nazies to occupy a large part of Italian territory. Having escaped captivity with the help of the Nazi army, Mussolini managed to recreate a fascist statelet, the Republic of Saló, in the north. The situation was so chaotic and serious that even the king and Badoglio fled from Rome. The people, however, did not stand by but sought to take advantage of the situation.

Various popular insurrections broke out following the Nazi occupation, factories were occupied, and workers tried to arm themselves as best they could. However, a strategic error prevented a full-blown insurrection in 1943: the anti-fascist forces had bet on an alliance between the population and the army, but most of the higher echelons of the military began to collaborate with the Nazis and suppress the insurrection.

After this umpteenth defeat of the anti-fascist front, on September 9, the National Liberation Committee (CLN) was founded with the participation of all anti-fascist parties. The CLN took root in most Italian cities and began to structure a network of resistance. The first major line proposal was put forward by the Action Party and the communists of the north: suspending the monarchy and proclaiming themselves a provisional government. This political line, however, was rejected by the moderate forces present in the CLN.

A month after the armistice with the Allies, on October 13, Badoglio declared war on Germany. On October 18, a radio message arrived from Togliatti and other PCI leaders in Moscow, which confused the communists in Italy whose anti-Badoglio ideas reflected the wider popular will. The message ordered the PCI to postpone any political disagreements until after the war and to unite around the Badoglio government. Among the communist ranks, Moscow’s interests started to appear very distant from those championed by the partisan war.

In fact, the leadership in Rome sent the following message to Moscow: “Your radio communications directing us to follow Badoglio present us with serious difficulties as they are in direct contradiction with the party’s and the CLN’s politics.”²

In the meantime, the PCI disseminated one of the most important documents that would profoundly shape the partisan struggle: “The Communist Party to the Italian People,” published on October 31, 1943, in a special edition of the newspaper L’unità. It identified the Badoglio government as the last-minute salvation of fascism, and established a line centered on class struggle in which the idea of democracy no longer corresponded to the bourgeois one but signified the participation of the popular masses in a radical renewal of society. Although the document proposed a radical line, the communist leadership in Rome settled on the “realist” line, hoping that the CLN—through its war against the Nazis—would be recognized upon the arrival of the Allies as the legitimate representative of the people upon the arrival of the Allies.

In this political framework, the PCI was divided between the north and the south, reflecting the two distinct social contexts in which the party found itself operating: the monarchy in the south, and Nazi occupation and the Republic of Salò in the north.

Indeed, the left-wing line of the National Liberation Committee, composed of the PCI, the PSI, and the Pd’A, was pushing for anti-Badoglio positions. Meanwhile, the right and centrist line (composed of the DC and the DLI) advocated for a line of collaboration. These parties, although anti-fascist, began to once again represent the interests of financial and industrial capital once again as the Italian bourgeoisie—after a brief period of crisis—had reconstituted itself within the new political system, accepted the end of fascism, and sought new political interlocutors.

At the same time in the north, the reality of war led many of its protagonists to support a Yugoslav line: from the Balkan lands, partisan guerrillas would advance with fury, sweeping away Nazism and the fascists and forming a new power based on the partisans. Even in Italy, the wind coming from the east drew attention to the extent that the fascists of Salò often portrayed the partisans as non-Italians, as “Slavs” fighting against the Italian homeland, to discredit them.

1944: In the Heat of the Battle

Thus, at the outset of 1944, Italy found itself divided in two between the north and south, and the anti-fascist movement was equally fragmented. In the south, the National Liberation Committee aimed at maintaining the new order and collaborating with the institutions, while, in the north, the CNL’s northern branch, the National Liberation Committee of the Italian Partisans (CLNAI), was waging a popular war against Nazism and fascism. It was in the north that the more radical ideas of emancipation emerged, even within the ruling class of the PCI. In the midst of the war, the possibility of a new democratic yet popular power emerged, capable of sweeping away fascism, the liberal state, and capitalism.

One of the most interesting interpretations came from Eugenio Curiel who was a member of the PCI leadership in Milan, but with a militant past that had escaped the dogmatic Stalinist control of the party. Indeed, he saw the cells of the CLN now spread across the entire Italian territory as a popular counter-power capable of eventually replacing the central and bureaucratic state, seen as an heir to fascism. To implement this counter-power, the first thing he proposed was a real representation within the CLN, reflecting true popular participation, that is, more communist and socialist, sidelining the more conservative anti-fascist forces.

Curiel saw the CLN’s activity as a demonstration of the enthusiasm of workers and the people. In its local cells he saw possible new soviets, to be turned into a future foundation of a true popular democracy, an expression of workers and peasants. Already back in March 1943, he wrote that “the CLN is today the prefiguration of the government of tomorrow, as it stimulates the emergence of national liberation organizations in all cities, all villages, and all neighborhoods… tomorrow it will be the effective democratic-popular government of the new Italy and will be able to mobilize the people, with its new popular army, alongside the armies of free peoples, for the annihilation of nazi-fascism.”³

But this would have been possible only if the people liberated themselves with their own means and without foreign interference—as was happening on the other side of the Adriatic inYugoslavia and Albania.

During the first months of 1944, the partisan groups became more organized and disciplined to the extent that they began to liberate entire areas, especially in the mountainous regions of Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria, where they formed self-governed Partisan Republics. These were, in fact, very heterogeneous formations, reflecting the territories in which they developed, their local populations, and, above all, the direction given by the partisans who constituted them: some experimented with forms of direct democracy making collective decisions with the population, while others maintained more hierarchical power structures with control by military commanders. However, they all were important experiences that demonstrated the potential for a decentralized territorial management under direct popular control. These republics often went beyond the control of the CLN, which, as we have seen, had a unified line and aimed to form a national government.

Indeed, the autonomous republics were not planned as a strategic line but born out of the developments of the struggle. As the Nazi occupants and the fascists of Salò lost territory, the newly liberated lands had to be managed in some way, life had to go on, and thus the spontaneous forms of territorial management were born. The Partisan Republics were short-lived due to their re-occupation by the Nazi-fascists. However, popular support for the partisans remained alive and grew stronger, nurturing hope and desire for a socialist society among the population.

In the cities as well, communist groups formed outside the PCI. In Rome, for example, the Movement of Italian Communists (MdCI) would gain a much larger following than the official party. This was because during fascism there were many revolutionary groups present in the same city, yet they did not know each other during fascism as they organized themselves in secrecy and developed separately from one another. For many years, the PCI was just one of these numerous groups, even though it enjoyed the official support of the USSR. In 1943, in Rome, MdCI was more numerous than the PCI for months, had more following among the city’s workers and unemployed, and fought with more courage than the partisans of the PCI.

This explosion of revolutionary currents, bottom-up government experiments, Yugoslav influence, and the resurgence of more libertarian ideas based on the direct control of the means of production will be cut short by two events that mark a downward turn for the entire liberation movement: Stalin recognizing the Badoglio government and sending Togliatti to Italy to defend the Moscow line expressed through the “Salerno Turn” – an alliance between Togliatti, the King, and Badoglio.

Consequences of the “Salerno Turn”

Stalin’s decision surprised all the antifascist left parties, including the PCI, who were until then calling for the abdication of the Italian king. By pre-empting the allies and recognizing the monarchy, Stalin secured himself a place in the new Italian government. The abandonment of a strategy centered on class interests in favor of legalism, however, was not well received either among the popular layers or at the base of the party— and much less by the partisans.

A strong criticism against the changed political line was expressed by the dissident communist group Bandiera Rossa from Milan: “The Communist Party, today as yesterday, acted in full obedience to Moscow, and the proof of this is the fact that the turn was decided and proclaimed by Togliatti, who had just arrived from Moscow, not only without consulting the other parties but also without consulting the other Communist leaders in Italy, who until the day before had been battling against Badoglio and the Monarchy […] Our reservations about the Communist Party concern, if anything, the rigid authoritarian centralism, which leads to these abrupt and frequent ‘turns,’ which end up disorienting the proletariat […] they undoubtedly represent an element of miseducation for the masses, who are forced to obey contradictory slogans without realizing why.”⁴

In Turin, even a part of the PCI base which already had a more autonomous attitude towards the party leadership decided to leave the party after theSalerno Turn and establish a separate organization called Stella Rossa, named after the symbol that partisans painted on their hats. This group criticized the leadership of the PCI and advocated for a total struggle against capitalism and its representatives, now recognizing them even among the ranks of anti-fascists.

“Capitalists, today, have become extreme antifascists, and they hope that this diversion will not only allow them to evade their responsibilities, but they count on the fact that in the fervor of antifascism, the people will exhaust all their vigor,” they declared on august 8, 1944.⁵

Stella Rossa understood that the bourgeoisie had already re-organized in post-fascist society and was jumping on the bandwagon of the victor without raising too many suspicions. In a letter against the leadership of the PCI, the dissidents of Stella Rossa reaffirmed: “The communist proletariat must constitute the vanguard of an anti-Nazi coalition, but this movement must not lead to the creation of a democratic liberal Italy, but rather to the establishment of the Italian Soviet Republic, the only solution that can resolve all our internal and foreign policy problems.”⁶

Stella Rossa and other political groups to the left of PCI advocated for a revolutionary resolution, although they still appealed to the myth of the USSR, which was the unquestionable giant of the proletarian revolution in the collective imagination of those years. It is unfortunate that Stalin’s political interests in Italy were quite different from those the proletarian communists hoped for. The Soviet shift to officially recognize the monarchy to get the representatives of the PCI to the government is better regarded not as a shift but as a return to the directives of the VII Congress of the Communist International in 1935 and the concept of the Popular Front.

Indeed, Togliatti, in order to push the communists to accept the new line, claimed the success of the republic in Spain to the communist participation in the government, while neglecting the consequences of the communist government against the self-managed cities of the FAI-CNT and against the other parties active in the revolution, such as the POUM.

In Italy, the communist presence in the government served to guarantee a Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and a card to be played in the future partition of the world. In exchange, the PCI offered control over the more radicalized masses and the more combative partisan groups. This control would perpetuate for decades in Italian history, until the

autonomous mobilizations of the 1960s and 1970s. The new Soviet position and the undisputed prestige of Togliatti made the position in support of national unity at all costs ultimately successful. With the liberation of Rome on June 4, 1944, the CLN attempted to claim a role in shaping the political direction, but due to the PCI’s “turn”—which acknowledged the participation of all parties in the national unity government— yet another opportunity was lost to dissolve the government and create a progressive democracy.

Following the Bonomi government, the PCI continued to uphold the idea of popular front, neglecting and underestimating the popular power that could implement a profound de-fascistization of society. The PCI supported a governmental line that was entirely internal to the institutions that were, in fact, heirs to the fascist regime. The presence of the PCI in the government hindered the implementation of all proposals put forward by the communists from the north, such as the creation of workers’ combat organs in factories. Choosing the institutional path denied the development of revolutionary lines, even though popular discontent with the economic crisis and the state’s lack of commitment in the war against the Nazi forces led the PCI to criticize the very government of which it was a part, without, however, questioning it.

The Bonomi government marked the end of the leading role of the CLN. A new government was formed, again by Bonomi as its head, but without the PSI and the Pd’A. Thus, the action pact between the PCI and the PSI was also broken, sealing the victory of conservative and pro-monarchist positions. The PCI’s choice to participate in the government reflected Soviet needs, thus accepting the continuity of the state and profoundly downsizing the CLN to a place exclusively of debate and no longer a decision-making body.

After the Insurrection, the Return of the Bourgeois Order

The insurrection of April 25, 1945, marked the end of the Salò Republic and the end of the war in Italy. However, the situation remained contradictory. In the north, the mass armed insurrection led all its protagonists to push for the continuation of the revolution by definitively breaking with the past regime.In Rome and the south, on the other hand, the state apparatus, a remnant of fascism, had fortified itself again, and there was a threatening presence of allied troops on the territory. The partisan war had defeated both Nazism and Fascism, as well as the old state with its administrative and police apparatus, and was now aimed to completely rebuild the representative institutions of civil society through a new and radical democracy that would not allow the resurgence of authoritarianism and fascism. In Rome and the south, on the other hand, the state apparatus, a remnant of fascism, had fortified itself again, and there was a threatening presence of allied troops on the territory.

With the fall of Bonomi government and the formation of a new cabinet around Ferruccio Parri, a partisan representative of the Pd’A, it seemed for a brief period that the enthusiasm of the north could invade the whole country. However, this government would have a short life. It collapsed after only five months due to the contradictions it attempted to reconcile. On one hand, it proposed a revolutionary push, while on the other, it sought reconciliation with right-wing parties like the DC, which had become the expression of conservatives and reactionaries; it supported the idea of a government of the masses while being part of the bourgeois parliamentarism; it embraced the will for a deep purge of fascism, while on the other hand, it aimed for national pacification.

Finally, with the fall of the Parri government, an agreement was reached among the new mass parties (the DC, the PCI, and the PSI) to urge the Constituent Assembly. This agreement marked the definitive end of the CLN.

The new De Gasperi government signified the end of the revolutionary process and the definitive return to bourgeois order. The provinces in the hands of the Allied troops were returned to the state in exchange for a guarantee of pro-American policies. The prefects and police chiefs installed by the CLN were replaced by career officials who remained loyal to fascism. The workers’ management in the seized factories was liquidated. The high commission for sanctions against fascism was dissolved, currency exchange was prohibited, and, above all, the partisan brigades were demobilized along with the return of the military arsenal to the state.

The continuity with the fascist state is evident. The gains from the partisan struggle were gradually eliminated, and repression returned as heavy as before, with deaths occurring during the post-war demonstrations against the high cost of living. The structure of the fascist state survived. With the first elections of 1946 that marked the birth of the Republic, the DC secured a victory with 35.2% of the vote, followed by the PSI with 20.7% and the PCI with 19%. With the victory of the DC begun the exclusion of the communists, and the party would never enter the government again.

In the post-war period, the experience of the partisan war and the mobilization of the people in its favor, along with popular participation in democratic governance, allowed for the preservation of social tension even though it was entirely subordinated to the direction of the parties. However, the idea of a possible autonomy in the struggle remained widespread. A striking example of this new consciousness was manifested after the attempted murder of Togliatti in 1948. Within a few hours, the partisan groups were reformed, factories were occupied, barricades sprung up, and even the weapons that had not been returned were present, with high hopes of a possible new insurrection that would finalize the revolution. Instead, Togliatti immediately ordered demobilization, marking his further deviation from the liberation movement.

The idea of a failed revolution will remain deeply rooted in those who participated in the partisan war, gaining new strength with the generation of the 60s and 70s with the rediscovery of autonomous struggles and the radical critique of the PCI and its subservience to USSR’s interests. Also, the concept of Resistance continued to develop and influence the current anti-fascist movement and a large part of the political spectrum that seeks to be revolutionary. During those years, the discussion was mainly about liberation war or partisan war to the extent that Pietro Secchia, a partisan and a communist leader, wrote: “From a tactical point of view, the partisan war is a form of struggle that is predominantly offensive, even when it proposes clearly defensive purposes and objectives.”⁷

Reducing the entire experience of the revolutionary process to a defensive resistance led to a negative conception of the insurrectional and creative purpose of that historical phase. Reducing the insurrectional experience to the exclusive interpretation of Resistance also served to eliminate various interpretative categories such as civil war, class struggle, and social liberation struggle. From this point of view, the only identified enemy was the occupying Nazi, overlooking the fact that the war was also against the fascists, as well as against the financial and industrial bourgeoisie who continued to collaborate, repress, and kill to defend their political system.

A testimony from a partisan stated: “I experienced the partisan period with the awareness that I was fighting a civil war; I never had the slightest doubt about it and I am proud to have participated in a struggle for freedom that, precisely because there has been continuity of the state between fascism and post-fascism, is far from being over.”⁸

It is necessary to return to conceiving the struggle for emancipation as offensive, as it was in the war of liberation, in order to conquer and build an egalitarian society.

1. “Lettere di Spartaco”, n. 47, 8 august 1943. ↩︎
2. M. Flores, Fronte popolare e democrazia progressiva, Edizioni Savelli, Roma, 1973, p. 37. ↩︎
3. Ibid, p. 48. ↩︎
4. Ibid, p.138. ↩︎
5. S. Corviseri, Resistenza e Democrazia, Mazzotta Editore, Milano, 1976, p. 141. ↩︎
6. Ibid, p. 144. ↩︎
7. P. Secchia, I comunisti e l’insurrezione, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1973, p.139. ↩︎
8. F. Tosi, Perché vergognarsi di aver combattuto una “guerra civile”?, “Resistenza unita”, 10, 1992. ↩︎