The PKK’s Dissolution Paves the Way for a New Era of Radical Democracy

The recent call by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) founder Abdullah Öcalan for the dissolution of his party and its protracted armed struggle caused political shock waves worldwide. Although the Kurdish movement’s reaction—declaring full support for Öcalan’s agenda and announcing a ceasefire a few days later—was clear, few expected that the PKK would turn its words into action so quickly. Despite ongoing attacks, the organization proceeded with the call‘s implementation since February 27, and announced its dissolution at an extraordinary congress held in early May, 47 years after its founding.

Has Turkey defeated the PKK guerrillas? Is this the end of the country’s most protracted insurgency? Is it the end of a movement that emerged half a century ago in response to the brutal oppression of the Kurdish people, inspired by the socialist national liberation struggles of that time? After all the scorched earth, millions of Kurds displaced, tens of thousands jailed and tortured, not to mention the ten thousand who lost their lives for the revolution? What will happen to the guerrillas who resisted the second-biggest NATO army in their tunnels in the rugged Kurdish mountains? What will happen to the women’s revolution that gained global recognition with its slogan, “Jin Jiyan Azadî”? Is all of this now over?

Millions of Kurds gathered in squares and their living rooms in front of screens to closely follow the message of their imprisoned leader with mixed feelings of sadness, skepticism, and hope. After years of total isolation and no signs of life, Öcalan’s historic call—titled “Call for Peace and Democratic Society”—managed to bring the Kurdish question to international headlines; prompting supportive statements from regional and global state actors. Meanwhile, the Turkish government claims to have brought the PKK to its knees and wants to take credit for creating a “Turkey without terror.” Many leftists fear that one of the strongest revolutionary movements will be eliminated, following similar sequences of events in Tamil Eelam, Colombia, or the Basque Country.

A closer look at Öcalan’s messages, which were carried by several family and DEM Party delegations that visited him on the prison island Imrali, and the PKK congress’ discussions, which are being published step by step through Kurdish media, reveals a different picture. The extraordinary 12th Congress of the PKK took a self-critical look at its history of resistance and past attempts at resolution. According to the final declaration of the Congress, the armed struggle has fulfilled its historical task by breaking down the oppression and denial of the Kurdish people. Now is the time to address the Kurdish issue through diverse methods. This historic moment should not be viewed as an ending, but rather as the beginning of a renewal process, as the Kurdish movement has experienced many times before. The declaration speaks of a “new phase in the peace process” and “the struggle for socialism.”

The Geo-Political Landscape

Our world is facing ecological collapse, increasing sexist and racist violence, war propaganda, and the resurgence of fascism. Leaders like Donald Trump and tech feudalists like Elon Musk seem to divide the world as they please. They view people as mere pawns in the interest of their global monopoly—they personify a rapidly mutating capitalist order. As the liberal international order crumbles and gives way to a global war regime, all political actors must reposition themselves. Thus, what is unfolding in Turkey is not a resolution of conflict, but rather, a renegotiation of its terms in the face of ongoing global chaos.

Since the beginning of this year, an average of over 200 people have been killed daily in the Middle East. In this context, Öcalan and his movement’s call for peace and democracy stands out as an anomaly. However, this move was neither spontaneous nor merely symbolic: it reflects a strategic recalibration in response to regional upheavals, particularly the transformations that have unfolded since October 7. The region’s dynamics have shifted dramatically, turning previous certainties into distant memories.

The geopolitical landscape in the Middle East has changed dramatically, especially due to Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza and its strategic strike against Iran, its main adversary. Iran was not sufficiently prepared for this attack, which exposed the supposed power of the “Axis of Resistance” as illusory. Despite the aggressive rhetoric and military activities of Hamas, Hezbollah, and other groups, Israel was able to achieve its military objectives and systematically dismantle the axis.

Over the past year and a half, Israel has strengthened its role as a regional power. The fall of the Assad regime was critical here as it further weakened Iran’s strategic position, in that Assad served as a link to Hezbollah. Meanwhile, Turkey, which otherwise aggressively pursues its imperialist ambitions, has remained largely inactive on the Palestinian issue. Despite publicly supporting the Palestinians, Turkey has maintained its trade relations with Israel, further undermining its position in the region and rendering it an even more hypocritical player in the Palestinian conflict.

Hezbollah’s downfall should have made it clear to the Turkish government that Israel’s ambitions extend beyond Palestine. Meanwhile, Iran will seize any opportunity to maintain its regional influence without directly confronting Israel. Such transformations are unlikely to please the Turkish government, whose own regional ambitions have been repeatedly stalled. In Syria, Turkey struggles to establish a “security zone” as its proxy militias refuse full cooperation despite receiving financial support from Ankara. In northern Iraq, Turkey has occupied some areas, but the PKK’s guerrilla forces have remained active and resilient; overcoming the threat of Turkish-produced killer drones through their tunnel warfare.

The sudden takeover of Syria by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which Turkey tolerates, does not align with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s original plans. Erdoğan has supported the Syrian National Army (SNA) for years. However, even though the SNA has joined the HTS, the two groups frequently clash. The deal between the HTS and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) further shows that self-government in Syria will not be crushed by the HTS and Turkey, contrary to what the Turkish media had hoped for after Assad’s fall. Thus, it is no coincidence that starting in October, Devlet Bahçeli—the leader of the far-right MHP party and a loyal ally of Erdoğan’s for many years—began speaking of a “ring of fire” and calling for a solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey. Current geopolitical changes in the region have likely prompted the government to reconsider its regional position and domestic policy by adopting “Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood” and “united fatherland” rhetoric to gain support from the Kurdish population. This is reminiscent of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s actions in 1919 to confront foreign interventions and lay the groundwork for the Republic of Turkey.

The new circumstances require all actors to recognize the changed reality. They must adapt and rethink their strategies or cling to old habits, risking failure.

The same is true for the Kurdish movement. The days when it could maneuver between American and Russian interests in Syria to gain advantages and protect the achievements of the Rojava Revolution are over. Exploiting instability in Iraq to win sympathy through tactical alliances, even with ideological opponents such as Iran’s allies, will be more difficult.

As DEM Party Co-Chair and Imrali delegation member Tuncer Bakirhan said, “Öcalan emphasizes that those who adapt politically, socially, and mentally to the spirit of the times and abandon old habits will not be buried under the rubble,” and compares this historical juncture to the fall of the Berlin Wall. He continued, “I think we will understand these changes better in the future.” What has happened in Gaza is a frightening example of what this can mean today.

While traditional leftist movements struggle to articulate coherent responses to contemporary crises and often find themselves trapped between state-centric reformism and ineffective protest politics, the Kurdish freedom movement has demonstrated through its actions how radical democracy can function, even under conditions of war and occupation. This is why its recent initiative resonates throughout the postcolonial world, where traditional governance models have failed to establish legitimacy; diversity has been weaponized; and states fluctuate between fragility and tyranny. Political Islam, nation-state nationalism, and foreign-imposed modernist approaches have been unable to provide the Middle East with solutions. These approaches have only deepened the chaos. For the Middle East to escape its historical deadlock, it must address the shortcomings of these outdated mental frameworks and adopt a new perspective.

As the failures of liberal democracy and authoritarian “solutions” become more apparent, Öcalan’s vision invites us to reimagine revolutionary change. His framework, centered on radical democracy, women’s liberation, and ecological sustainability, addresses more than just the Kurdish issue. His vision of Democratic Nation-Confederalism presents a universal approach rooted in regional contexts, aiming to heal the political wounds inflicted by modern state formation and imperialism. Though the path forward remains uncertain, this emerging process presents a rare opportunity for transformation in an otherwise bleak global political landscape.

From National Liberation Struggle to Democratic Confederalism

To understand the significance of the recent developments, we must explore PKK’s ideological evolution and the historical struggle for a resolution to what Öcalan has described as a “Gordian knot”—Turkey’s deep-rooted Kurdish question.

The Kurdish liberation struggle in Turkey emerged as a direct response to the violent suppression of Kurdish identity under the Turkish nation-state’s homogenizing project. Like the borders of other states in the region, the modern borders of Turkey were shaped by imperialist interests and reflect the priorities of Western powers rather than the will of the region’s peoples.

By the 1970s, resistance to these colonial border arrangements and the broader structures of imperialism had evolved. It was in this context that the PKK was founded in 1978, with Abdullah Öcalan as its key theorist. The PKK launched a guerrilla campaign in 1984, igniting hopes for self-determination. Still, the conflict with NATO’s second-largest army exacted a heavy toll, claiming tens of thousands of lives, mainly Kurdish.

The PKK emerged during a wave of global anti-colonial and socialist movements, initially framing its struggle within Marxist-Leninist national liberation theory. However, after the collapse of real-socialism and in the face of the Gulf War at the beginning of 90s, the PKK did not dissolve. Instead, it deepened its critique and evolved toward democratic socialism, confederalism, and women’s liberation as central tenets of its political vision. Meanwhile, the PKK gained mass popular support, particularly from women, in Kurdish territories in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and beyond.

A fleeting opportunity for peace arose in 1993, when Öcalan and the PKK declared a ceasefire and sought dialogue with Turkish President Turgut Özal. Tragically, Özal’s sudden death under suspicious circumstances—just as he was preparing to respond—shattered this opening. The outcome was a devastating war that saw the widespread employment of scorched-earth tactics. Over 4,000 Kurdish villages were destroyed, millions were displaced, and systematic human rights abuses proliferated. These abuses were often met with complicit silence from much of Turkish society and the international community.

Despite Turkey’s international backing, the criminalization of the PKK, and relentless state repression, Öcalan continued to advocate for a political solution. After being forced to leave his base in Syria and attempting to rally international support in Europe, he was abducted in Kenya in a U.S. orchestrated operation in February 1999. In 2002, Öcalan, whom millions of people called “my political representative,” was sentenced to death, which was commuted to an “aggravated life sentence” that excluded the possibility of parole. International human rights laws consider such a punishment a form of torture, as it denies prisoners the right to hope.

Instead of diminishing his influence, Öcalan’s imprisonment sparked ideological innovations that resulted in a new political paradigm. His extensive prison writings, which span thousands of pages, offer a scathing critique of capitalist modernity and put forth a concept of “democratic modernity” as a liberating alternative.

In the early 2000s, the Kurdish freedom movement pursued a radical democratic transformation. At its 8th Party Congress, the PKK announced its dissolution and transition into KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress), marking a strategic shift toward decentralized, pluralist organizing, which Öcalan envisioned as “an organizational form based on the democratic and free unity of the peoples of the Middle East.” This transformation, however, was met with immediate internal contradictions and repression by the “war against terror” policy of Wester powers, resulting in the PKK’s further reorganization in 2005.

The PKK then assumed a new role as the ideological vanguard of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), a confederation of Kurdish and allied leftist movements in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran that adheres to Abdullah Öcalan’s ideas of democratic confederalism. This was not just a tactical rebranding but an ideological evolution aimed at replacing armed struggle with democratic mobilization while maintaining self-defense capabilities.

This restructuring laid the groundwork for later revolutionary experiments, fueled by the dynamics of the “Arab Spring” in 2011—especially in North Kurdistan (Turkey) and, in particular, in Rojava (Syria) and Shengal (Iraq). There, the movement’s ideological framework fostered radical democracy, women’s liberation, and multi-ethnic coexistence. The 2022 Jin, Jiyan, Azadî uprising in East Kurdistan and Iran further demonstrated the movement’s ability to inspire mass mobilization beyond armed resistance.

A Historic Call and a New Road Map After Years of Isolation

Only a few months ago, a renewed dialogue seemed unimaginable, especially after Abdullah Öcalan endured three and a half years of total isolation, with all visit requests from his lawyers denied since 2019. However, in October 2024, an unexpected turn occurred when Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the far-right MHP, proposed in the Turkish Parliament Öcalan’s release in exchange for the PKK’s self-dissolution. Shortly after, Ömer Öcalan was permitted to meet him and convey a message from Abdullah Öcalan to the public: “I have the theoretical and practical power to pull this process from the ground of conflict and violence to the ground of law and politics.”

Since then, Turkey has cautiously shifted towards renewed dialogue, despite widespread skepticism stemming from the ruling government’s history of failed peace initiatives, particularly the collapse of negotiations between 2013 and 2015. Notably, several family visits have taken place, and DEM delegations have met with Öcalan and transmitted letters to the PKK leadership in the Qandil Mountains, the Syrian Democratic Forces in north-east Syria; as well as Kurdish organizations like the women’s groups, youth groups, Yazidi groups, and broader civil society groups in Europe— grounding the process in a grassroots social base.

Öcalan’s appeal to the PKK to lay down their arms and disband emphasized that Turkey must enter a new phase of democratic transformation that recognizes all social identities. According to Öcalan, the only way to achieve peaceful and fraternal coexistence was through a juridically instituted democratic politics. The call represented the culmination of months of mediation and dialogue with various political actors, reflecting a concerted effort to reshape the political landscape. Gaining traction earlier this year, it has sparked intense discussions and catalyzed new political debates.

In response, the 12th Congress of the PKK clarified that the decision of “dissolving the PKK’s organizational structure and ending its armed struggle as a fundamental strategy” does not signify the end, but rather a new phase in the struggle for freedom, democracy, and socialism. The Kurdish people, especially women and youth, will take on the responsibilities of this new democratic struggle and self-organization to build a democratic society. However, the Congress emphasized that these decisions will only succeed if Öcalan is released to guide the process, if his right to participate in democratic politics is recognized, and if strong legal guarantees are established.

The Congress’ declaration urged the Turkish Parliament to accept its historical responsibilities and encouraged the government, opposition parties, marginalized groups, and the entire civil society to participate in the peace process. The Congress called for global solidarity among democratic peoples in the struggle for “Democratic Society Socialism” to foster a “Global Democracy Movement” for a just and equal world. It also invited international powers to acknowledge their century-long genocidal policies, refrain from obstructing a democratic solution, and contribute constructively.

Through his latest comprehensive assessment sent to the PKK’s Congress, Öcalan transformed his historic February 27 call for a “Peace and Democratic Society” into a roadmap for political change that the Congress now embodies. This marks an organizational transformation within the PKK and a political invitation for Turkey to adopt a more democratic system.

Öcalan asserts that the PKK’s emergence can be traced back to the political and military conditions of its time. However, the PKK has fulfilled its historical mission and therefore loses its meaning in the present. To respond to geopolitical developments in the region and complete the transition to a decentralized form of organization that began in the early 2000s, the party must adapt its methods to today’s world. This adaption, Öcalan emphasized, should usher in “a total struggle for freedom and democracy instead of a civil war.”

In a twenty-page text and a four-point letter, Öcalan examined the evolution of the Kurdish movement and proposes a reorganization centered on a new socio-political vision. He identifies seven key themes for this reorientation. Öcalan asserts that the discussion around the PKK’s dissolution transcends mere organizational issues, emphasizing the need for a profound transformation of mentality and personal identity. Central to his vision is establishing a society based on “democratic socialism,” with a focus on a “democratic nation,” an ecological economy, and communal self-governance.

He critically examines his relationship with his cadres and his people, who usually call him “Apo,” short for Abdullah. He says, “Apo is not a messiah who fell from the sky,” but rather, a leader who created himself through “effort and social realization.” Apo is the embodiment of a “socialist” and “collective leadership,” not a “cult of personality,” he says.

Recognizing the contradiction between the state and the commune, he states, “Just as the nation-state is a weapon of capitalism, the founding principle and weapon of the peoples is the commune.” He proposes, in turn, the possibility of building democratic, communal society, will be through a confederation of communes administrated by municipalities.

In a meeting with a DEM Party delegation on May 18, Öcalan reiterated his call for a “democratic reconciliation” process based on a redefined social contract. He demands that both the PKK and the Turkish state must change to make the transformation process a success. The Kurdish question is essentially a question of democracy and freedom, he says, thereby undermining Turkey’s argument that the problem is only the PKK and its weapons.

Now the Ball is in Ankara’s Court

Responsibility now rests with the Turkish state. Without concrete steps, the current window of opportunity could close quickly, potentially leading to the return of a vicious cycle of violence.

The practical implementation of Öcalan’s road map is not possible under Turkey’s current system: its anti-democratic mindset, its autocratic and arbitrary governments, its anti-terrorism laws, and the political instrumentalization of the judiciary. Rapid changes in politics, the legal system, and society are needed. Recognizing the Kurds and other ethnic and religious identities living in Turkey requires democracy, political awareness, and justice. Such a democratic transformation would signal a turning point not only for the Kurdish struggle but also for Turkey and the broader Middle East.

The Kurdish question is no longer ignored. The PKK has raised awareness and challenged Turkey’s denial of Kurdish rights. The Kurds have emerged as key players in the Middle East, particularly in the fight against ISIS. They are the solution. Who gains the Kurds, wins the Middle East.

Despite spending hundreds of billions of dollars, Turkey has not defeated the PKK militarily and is experiencing a profound social, political, and economic crisis. Kurdish autonomy has been established in neighboring Syria and Iraq, challenging Turkey’s principles of centralized sovereignty and singular citizenship.

Now that the PKK is stepping back, responsibility shifts to the Turkish state and its Western allies. The PKK’s dissolution removes a pretext for Ankara and NATO to dismiss Kurdish demands for democratic rights. It increases pressure on Western states to reconsider the PKK’s terrorist designation. Meanwhile, Öcalan’s imprisonment has made him a global symbol of resistance, uniting activists worldwide in campaigns for his freedom.

This issue can no longer be regarded merely as a security concern or an identity demand. After a century of unresolved tension, systemic transformation is essential because the political regime has constructed the Kurds and society as a whole through denial, oppression, and a lack of representation. Therefore, finding a solution is crucial both for the Kurdish people and the democratic future of Turkish society as whole.

However, there has been no indication of a genuine intention to resolve the Kurdish issue or implement democratic reforms. In recent months, Turkey has continued its unabated attacks on guerrilla forces and crackdowns on Kurdish civil society. At the same time, the trustees who replaced the DEM Party’s elected mayors remain in office. The government’s goal is to maintain its power and secure another term in office—to do so, it needs the Kurdish votes that contributed to the opposition CHP party’s success in past local elections. The government recently demonstrated its willingness to weaken the opposition at any cost by imprisoning Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu under the pretext of supporting the Kurdish movement; triggering a new wave of protests across the country in March.

Some argue that the Turkish state is merely attempting to pacify the revolutionary Kurdish movement to buy time, establish alternative alliances, and prepare for a more aggressive military response against Kurdish guerrillas and civilians. They claim that the Turkish state is not trying to achieve a lasting, just peace.

The Struggle Continues

During its more than 40-year armed struggle against Turkey, the PKK has unilaterally declared a ceasefire nine times. The PKK has never been naive enough to trust the Turkish government blindly. This time is no different. “The demands are very clear. If they are met, there will be peace. Otherwise, there will be no peace,” said Murat Karayilan, commander-in-chief of the PKK’s armed units, at the conclusion of the PKK party Congress on May 7. The Congress’s decision undoubtedly represents a turning point in many respects, yet it is by no means a departure from the fundamental values that have brought the PKK to this point.

The PKK’s move is not motivated by naivety or weakness. According to Executive Council member Murat Karayilan, the PKK has proven its strength by laying down its arms, which is a necessary step for its entrance in a new phase of the struggle. After 52 years of relentless struggle, there has been a significant revival in society and among women, marking a revolution in social, intellectual, and democratic realms. This ongoing struggle has evolved, focusing on deepening democratic politics, ecology, and women’s emancipation, while advancing towards a confederal model alongside other peoples of the region.

Speeches at the congress emphasized that the resistance has long since spread beyond Kurdistan and that the movement’s vision appeals to all oppressed people worldwide. Therefore, new forms of organization must emerge that are more open and diverse. These forms will be no less radical. Rather, the struggle will take on a new form, be handed over to society, and deepen, building on the legacy of the fallen fighters and the tens of thousands who have died. According to Besê Hozat, co-chair of the Executive Council of the Union of Communities of Kurdistan (KCK), the struggle against patriarchy should be at the center of this. She explains that a good half of the 21-page assessment that Öcalan sent to the Congress is an analysis of gender relations. Generations of people shaped by the Kurdish movement will resolutely continue political organizing for a socialist and feminist transformation of society.

A New Paradigm

Öcalan’s ideas, which reconcile universal values and the realities of the region, have transcended the Kurdish movement and inspired global struggles.

His critique of capitalist modernity—with its “three apocalyptic horsemen”: nation-states, capitalism, and industrialism—is matched by a constructive alternative: democratic modernity. This alternative synthesizes democratic nation-confederalism, an ecological economy, communalism, and women’s liberation, as an interdependent system.

Öcalan argues that just as liberal feminism, which believes that gender equality can be achieved through equal participation in capitalism, or anarchism, which borrows its concept of freedom from bourgeois individualism, will fail, so too will an economist socialism that views the power relations associated with statehood and patriarchy as secondary.

The Kurdish freedom movement has emerged as a pivotal force in contemporary revolutionary theory by placing women’s liberation at the forefront of its struggle. Initially, a national resistance movement, it transformed when Kurdish women asserted that emancipation must address colonial occupation and patriarchal structures. In his March 8 message, Abdullah Öcalan emphasized this shift, stating: “The women’s issue is deeper than the Kurdish question[…] He who does not know how to talk to a woman cannot be a socialist.”

The movement asserts that socialism requires women’s liberation and has translated this theory into practice by developing Jineolojî (“women’s science”); establishing autonomous women’s self-defense forces such as the YPJ (Women’s Protection Units); and implementing co-chair governance systems to ensure gender parity in leadership.

Öcalan argues that revolution doesn’t mean the seizure of power. Thus, self-determination does not require the formation of new nation-states because doing so would exacerbate existing issues. He promotes respect for identities, free expression, and the democratic self-organization of every part of society based on its own socioeconomic and political structures. This concept is encapsulated in his formula: “Democracy plus the state as a general public authority.” This vision promotes the construction of dual power—or “democratic autonomy”—through communes, cooperatives, academies, and councils, which resonates with various communalist movements worldwide. Instead of being governed from above, the people would democratically control the state, thereby limiting its power or rendering it superfluous.

The concept of “democratic nation-confederalism” proposes a democratic model that accommodates the diverse cultures and identities of the Middle East. The current situation highlights the urgent need for this alternative, as identity-based conflicts—such as the oppression of Kurds, violence in Palestine, and attacks on Alawites and Druze—reveal the failures of the nation-state system. The region’s rich cultural diversity is under threat due to imperialisms fragmentation of communities into mini-nation states, including the division of Kurdistan.

Öcalan sees the actions of imperial powers and the resulting wars as serious threats to the region’s peoples. He cautions that foreign manipulation of Kurds could escalate conflicts and advocates for a democratization of the existing nation-states. His concepts of a “democratic nation” and a “common homeland” provide a framework for coexistence that transcends colonial borders and ethnic nationalism; emphasizing dialogue as the foundation for democratic politics. This approach could promote peaceful relations between Kurds and Turks within a “Democratic Republic” and serve as a model for resolving conflicts globally.

The March 2025 integration agreement between Damascus and the SDF shows that autonomy can stabilize states by transforming adversarial relationships into cooperative ones. The agreement preserved DAANES institutions while linking security forces to the state. However, Damascus’s reluctance to constitutionally recognize Kurdish identity, evident in its retention of the term “Arab Republic” and its refusal to officially acknowledge the Kurdish, risks repeating the very conflict that sparked the initial unrest. A democratic Syria, whether federal or decentralized, would derive strength from its diversity, neutralizing external interference by ensuring that all communities have a stake in Syria’s future—the alternative is perpetual fractures.

Building Peaceful and Democratic Society

Genuine peace requires addressing the root causes of violence, not just signing ceasefire agreements. Previous Turkish initiatives have failed because they focused solely on stopping armed conflict, ignoring the underlying nationalistic and oppressive mindset that caused the PKK’s insurgency.

At this juncture, the most critical factor is social pressure. The new process cannot depend solely on the government’s stance. Expectations in these matters are not directed at those who rule the world, who are shaped by an imperialist, capitalist, commercial mentality. Instead, they are directed at all people around the world who take universal values seriously and advocate for equal, fraternal, peaceful living. The organized political representation of the Kurdish people will have to establish a democratic foundation for reconciliation that includes broad segments of society.

This requires extensive social mobilization and engagement with civil society, labor, women’s movements, and youth at local, national, and international levels. Peace is not merely a demand directed at the state: it emerges from a new social contract within society itself.

However, the implications of this process extend beyond regional dynamics and carry substantial international significance. The emergence of regional confederalism is becoming increasingly essential in the face of a century of imperial divide-and-conquer policies that have caused ethno-sectarian conflicts. In this context, Öcalan’s idea of “democratic confederalism as a viable antidote” gains global legitimacy. Therefore, Öcalan’s message to his party’s Congress concludes with a call to build a “new international” with friends and allies around the world.